Where the district court erroneously premises its denial of a meritorious, unopposed motion for continuance of the trial on a mistaken belief that the defendant sought the continuance to delay the proceedings, must the defendant on direct appeal establish specific prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial in order to meet the 'affecting substantial rights' test for reversal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) or is it enough for the defendant on appeal to show that his counsel lacked an adequate opportunity to review potentially relevant evidence?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Where the district court erroneously premises its denial of a meritorious, unopposed motion for continuance of the trial on a mistaken belief that the defendant sought the continuance to delay the proceedings, must the defendant on direct appeal establish specific prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial in order to meet the “affecting substantial rights” test for reversal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) or is it enough for the defendant on appeal to show that his counsel lacked an adequate opportunity to review potentially relevant evidence? 2. Because the residual-clause definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague, should the Court remand for further consideration in light of United States v. Davis, No. 18-431,__U.S.__ (June 24, 2019)? 3. Does Section 403 of the First Step Act, “Clarification of Section 924(c) of Title 18, United States Code,” which bars application of mandatory consecutive 25-year sentences for second or subsequent § 924(c) offenses charged in a single indictment, require a remand for resentencing of Petitioner without application of five consecutive 25-year sentences totaling an additional 125 years of imprisonment? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no parties interested in the proceeding other than those named in the caption of the appellate decision. ii