Whether the petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the petitioner, Jason Keith Walker, is entitled to a certificate of appealability on his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in derogation of Walker’s Sixth Amendment rights in three respects: (1) during plea negotiations when trial counsel advised Walker that he faced a maximum penalty of 20 years instead of life; (2) providing erroneous advise that co-defendants’ plea agreements could not be used against Walker at trial or sentencing; and, (3) trial counsel’s assessment that the government would not be able to prove its case because it was based on unreliable witnesses, known perjurers, and lack of evidence that Pitch Dark Family (PDF) was a criminal enterprise. 2. Whether the petitioner, Jason Keith Walker, is entitled to a certificate of appealability on his claim that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in derogation of Walker’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment in two respects: (1) failing to assert the trial evidence was insufficient to establish that PDF was an ongoing organization composed of associates functioning as a continuing unit; and, (2) failing to challenge prosecutorial misconduct or evidence based on perjured and unreliable testimony. 3. Whether the petitioner, Jason Keith Walker, is entitled to a certificate of appealability on his claim that the Government violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by: (1) failing to disclose the i fact that a Government witness was a paid informant then failing to correct the informant’s false trial testimony that he had received no money from the Government; and, (2) knowingly allowing five Government witnesses to provide perjured trial testimony. 4, Whether the denial of petitioner’s request for a certificate of appealability improperly condoned the prosecutor’s profligate misconduct in not only failing to disclose to the defense before trial that a Government witness had been paid as an informant in violation of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), but also by not correcting the informant’s false trial testimony that he received no money from the Government, in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)? ii