Did the Ninth Circuit err in concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is categorically not applicable to § 2241 petitions?

question presented is: Did the Ninth Circuit err in concluding — in direct conflict with the Court’s holding in Exxon — that the Rooker—Feldman doctrine is categorically not applicable to § 2241 petitions including those in which state-court losers invite district court review and rejection of allegedly injurious state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and pursuant to which the state-court losers are not in custody? ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED — Continued [2] A long line of decisions of the Court leaves no doubt that the review of a trial court’s broad discretion to declare a mistrial based on manifest necessity “‘abjures the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety’” of the declaration. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 n. 20 (1978) (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S., at 462). The second question presented is: Did the Ninth Circuit err in concluding — in direct conflict with the Court’s holding in Washington — that the trial court’s mistrial declaration was not supported by manifest necessity based on the result of its mechanical application of the three-step formula of its own creation that is virtually identical to the three-factor formula that Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010), made clear is not “a constitutional test that determine[s] whether a trial judge has exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial?” ili RELATED CASES State v. Gouveia, 139 Hawai‘i 70, 384 P.3d 846 (2016). Opinion entered October 25, 2016. State v. Gouveia, 1385 Hawai'i 219, 348 P.3d 496 (App. 2015), aff'd, 139 Hawai‘ 70, 384 P.3d 846 (2016). Summary Disposition Order entered May 25, 2017.