Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in requiring more than evidence that the sentence 'might have been different' to establish a due process violation under United States v. Tucker

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, Eulos Knight faced a potential mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison at the time of his indictment. In plea negotiations, Mr. Knight agreed to forego arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence in exchange for avoiding the ACCA mandatory minimum sentence. Subsequently, this Court held the ACCA’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and applied Johnson retroactively in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). Based on Johnson and Welch, Mr. Knight was never eligible for ACCA treatment, so he moved for collateral relief. Although the district court denied relief, the Ninth Circuit recognized the constitutional basis for resentencing but denied relief on the merits by requiring the defendant to present evidence that the misinformation was “demonstrably made the basis for his sentence.” The Circuits are split regarding the showing needed to establish that due process requires resentencing under United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). The questions presented are: Where sentencing is imposed based on misinformation of constitutional magnitude regarding the import of the defendant’s criminal record, did the Ninth Circuit’s deviation from this Court’s standard in Tucker, by requiring more than evidence that the sentence “might have been different” if the judge had the correct information, result in an unconstitutionally unreliable sentence in violation of due process of law? In any event, should the Court grant the writ, vacate the denial of relief, and remand for the district court to apply the due process standard to the facts of the case because, in the absence of any explanation from the sentencing judge, the Ninth Circuit should have remanded to permit the trial court to make the missing findings in the first instance under this Court’s precedent prioritizing the district court’s role in making initial factual determinations and presuming prejudice from Guidelines errors?