Whether the Second Circuit's decision in the instant case created a conflict with the Court's decision in Chapman, supra?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Constitution, through both the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees criminal defendants the right to present evidence in their favor. The Supreme Court has held that harmless error analysis applies when reviewing a Sixth Amendment violation. See, Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257 (1988). However, the burden for finding such harmless error in light of a constitutional question is high. In order to find harmless error, this Court must be satisfied that, “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). In the Second Circuit, the test for determining when a violation of this constitutional right requires a reversal is “whether the exclusion of [witnesses’] testimony violated [defendant’s] right to present a defense depends upon whether “the omitted evidence [evaluated in the context of the entire record] creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.” Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2000). The question presented is: Whether the Second Circuit’s decision in the instant case created a conflict with the Court’s decision in Chapman, supra? Further, whether the Second Circuit’s decision in the instant case created precedent that will allow the government to change its theory of a case, at the eleventh hour, without any proof of that theory and violate defendants’ rights to due process as a result? i