Does the Eleventh Circuit too rigidly apply its 'prior panel precedent rule?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Does the Eleventh Circuit too rigidly apply its “prior panel precedent rule” — effectively denying Eleventh Circuit defendants their statutory right to appeal and constitutional right to due process of law— by holding that three-judge panels of that court must follow even an admittedly “flawed” prior panel decision that failed to consider precedent(s) of this Court in existence at the time, and whose mode of legal analysis is now demonstrably inconsistent with intervening precedents of this Court, when most other circuits broadly agree that a three-judge panel may not only reconsider but should decline to follow an obviously “flawed” prior precedent under such circumstances, as stare decisis requires that subsequent panels adhere to the correct mode of analysis dictated by precedents of this Court? Is a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of “putting in fear” categorically a “violent felony” under the only remaining definition of that term in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)G) (an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another’), if the Department of Justice has conceded that the state robbery offense is indivisible and that “putting in fear” is an alternate “means” of violating the statute when this Court in Stokeling did not resolve that issue because that “means” was not presented on certiorari? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no