Whether the standard for assessing the harmlessness of an erroneously submitted deliberate-ignorance instruction turns only on the legal sufficiency of the evidence of guilt, as the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold, or instead requires an inquiry into the instruction's potential effect on the jury's verdict, as the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits hold

QUESTION PRESENTED Every federal court of appeals recognizes that the unwarranted submission of a “deliberate ignorance” instruction—one that informs the jury that it may find the defendant had “knowledge” of any fact he deliberately avoided learning—is a trial error. But the circuits are sharply divided over the standard for determining when, if ever, that error independently merits reversal. Five circuits deem the error harmless only upon a showing that there is no reasonable possibility that the instruction influenced the jury’s verdict, and these courts have reversed where the record failed to provide the requisite level of confidence in the outcome. In contrast, the seven remaining circuits hold that this instructional error is per se harmless so long as the record contains legally sufficient evidence of actual knowledge, and thus, guilt. The question presented is: Whether the standard for assessing the harmlessness of an erroneously submitted instruction turns only on the legal sufficiency of the evidence of guilt, as the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits hold, or instead requires an inquiry into the instruction’s potential effect on the jury’s verdict, as the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits hold. 1