DueProcess HabeasCorpus
What is the scope of the evidence for a court's assessment of innocence under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)?
QUESTION PRESENTED Larry Ray Swearingen is scheduled to be executed tomorrow, on August 21, 2019, even though critical evidence used to convict him has been recanted and revised by the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory (“DPS”) in the past month. Specifically, DPS noted that two of its experts provided scientifically invalid testimony at Mr. Swearingen’s trial. One expert negated otherwise powerfully exculpatory DNA evidence by claiming that the presence of an unknown man’s blood under the victim’s fingernails at the time of the discovery of the body (which excluded Mr. Swearingen) was the result of contamination. DPS now concedes that this expert had no direct knowledge and had an insufficient basis to support any such position. In addition, DPS conceded that its trace analyst should not have provided testimony that a pattern matching association of two pieces of pantyhose entered into evidence (one of which was used as the murder weapon and one which was allegedly found in Mr. Swearingen’s residence) was a “unique” match and a match “to the exclusion of all other pantyhose.” Mr. Swearingen sought authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to file a successor petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that these DPS corrections of past testimony, when viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, including the lack of a single piece of physical or any other direct evidence connecting Mr. Swearingen to the crime, and additional scientific evidence which further invalidates the State’s proof at trial, constituted the necessary prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). The Fifth Circuit denied the motion, holding that the recent DPS concessions would not, in and of themselves, exonerate Mr. Swearingen in light of the supposed "weight" of the State’s proof of guilt at trial. In considering whether Mr. Swearingen met the innocence showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)Gi), the Fifth Circuit considered only the new claims—declining to consider any additional exculpatory evidence that was presented in support of claims raised in a prior application. Discussing the merits of Mr. Swearingen’s due process claim, the Fifth Circuit rejected Mr. Swearingen’s classification of the DPS statements conceding certain invalid scientific testimony as evidence of “false” testimony under this Court’s standard set forth in Napue v. People of Ill, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The questions presented are as follows: 1) What is the scope of the evidence for a court’s assessment of innocence under 28 US.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)Gi)? Is a court of appeals’ consideration of exculpatory evidence limited to the specific newly discovered evidence supporting the new constitutional ii claim or should the court undertake a more holistic evaluation of the evidence as a whole as required under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)? 2) Where an applicant has discovered that State sponsored testimony at trial was scientifically invalid, should such testimony be considered “false and misleading testimony” such that the applicant has been denied due process in violation of the United States Constitution?