Whether a sentence is 'imposed' within the meaning of §401(c) of the First Step Act when it is first issued by the district court, or when it becomes final following exhaustion of the direct-appeal process

question presented is whether a sentence is “imposed” within the meaning of §401(c) when it is first issued by the district court, or when it becomes final following exhaustion of the direct-appeal process. 2. In its recent decision in Rehaif v. United States, this Court concluded that, to prove a status-based possession charge under §922(g), the government “must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019). The government did not endeavor to make that showing in this case. The second question presented is whether petitioner is entitled to a grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light of Rehaif.