Does the application of the 'enterprise profits' theory stretch the application of the VCAR statute far beyond what Congress intended and federalize a state murder case?

QUESTION PRESENTED | The VCAR statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), contains two “motive” elements, only : one of which applies to Petitioner’s case. To prove this element, Respondent was i required to show Petitioner committed the murder in aid of racketeering offense as | “consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to i is pay, anything of pecuniary value from” the indicted RICO enterprise. At Petitioner’s trial, Respondent elicited neither direct evidence nor circumstantial evidence from 2 which an inference could be drawn, to prove this motivational element. / On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied the “enterprise profits” theory of pecuniary-gain motivation to conclude Respondent shouldered its burden. This | theory satisfies the motive element by focusing on whether some of the individuals i involved in the VCAR offense were RICO enterprise members, as opposed to whether Petitioner’s paymaster was an enterprise member. i i Does the application of the “enterprise profits” theory stretch the application i / of the VCAR statute far beyond what Congress intended and federalize a state i murder case? / | : ' | i | | t ii i i g