Whether a Court of Appeals' denial of a certificate of appealability conflicts with this Court's rulings in Vasquez v. Hillery

QUESTION PRESENTED Mr. Whitaker claimed in federal habeas proceedings that his guilty plea violated his right to due process because he entered it unaware of relevant statutory maximum penalties. Acknowledging that the claim was procedurally defaulted, he asserted that the procedural default should be excused because ineffective assistance of trial counsel caused it. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). Correlatively, he argued that the procedural default of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was procedurally defaulted but that it should be excused due to ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Relying on a related but, Mr. Whitaker contends, distinct claim, the District Court rejected Mr. Whitaker’s assertion that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was exhausted. The question presented is: Whether a Court of Appeals’ denial of a certificate of appealability conflicts with this Court’s rulings in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 US. 254, 260 (1986), where the district court determined that the state court claim that trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the defendant to enter a guilty plea based on counsel’s “misleading information about the law and sentencing and how it applied” exhausted the more specific federal habeas claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of relevant statutory maximum penalties. i