Whether the State of Texas lawfully overrode the petitioner's final judgment and order of commitment, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, Double Jeopardy Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

No question identified. : QUESTION (S) PRESENTED 1. By what authority did you base your actions on when having the Petitioner confined at Texas Civil Commitment Center? 2. What evidence was relied upon as basis to “seize” Petitioner and return him to custody at Texas Civil Commitment Center? — . 3. Are you aware that Petitioner involuntary conversion (at the time of . commission) effectively disregards his “Final Judgment,” officially rendered in the 435% District Court of Montgomery County, Texas? [Judge P.K. Reiter Presiding]. 4. By what authority have you overridden Petitioner “Final Judgment” rendered by “Judge Reiter? 5. Did you present newly discovered evidence at hearing or trial, upon which your seizure of Petitioner is justifiable? 6. If so, what is the controlling question of law, which represents said justification? 2 7. Do you consider your actions taken against Petitioner reasonable consideration shown for his “Liberty Interest”? 8. Was Petitioner duly notified of you filing an “interlocutory appeal,” in order to . stay the Judgment rendered by “Judge P.K. Reiter?” 9. If so, are you aware of the fact that “Petitioner was denied an opportunity to make an appeal bond”? _ 10. Do you believe “Judge P.K. Reiter” rendered an equitable decision on behalf : of the Petitioner, thereby releasing him from “Civil Commitment? 11. If not, why do you feel that this decision (made) is wrong and therefore. had to , be appealed immediately? ) 12 Was Petitioner considered “High-Risk while residing at the Avalon halfwayHouse in Dallas Texas?” ; : 13. “If so, what was the reason?” : 14. “If not, why not?” . . 15. Why was Petitioner still considered a threat to the Community “when he was : not considered High-Risk to reoffend?” , 16. Can the State of Texas (lawfully) override and indivisible contract [Petitioner Final Judgment and order of commitment, hereinafter referred to as Final Judgment and order of Commitment] by novation (substitution of contract) and thereby rely upon an Amended Court Order which conflicts with Petitioner valid Final Judgment and Order Commitment [contract] rendered in a competent Court _ of law? Marbury v. Madison (1803). , 17. Can the State of Texas (lawfully) enact retrospective law that results in repudiation of its contractual obligation to Petitioner, when to do so substantially impair said contract and thereby impacts both Petitioner life and liberty interest? Calder v. Bull (1798). 18. Is it lawful for the State of Texas to abuse its Sovereign power via overbroad use of the United States Constitution, [Tenth Amendment] with the necessary and . 4 proper Clause to deny and disparage Petitioner Civil Rights, thereby relegating him _ to Status as a second-class citizen by the gross encroachment upon the federal = constitutions [Ninth Amendment]? Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). . . 19. Can the Texas Civil Commitment Act, as amended under Senate Bill 746, be ; considered Civil, Remedial and non-punitive under "intents effects scrutiny"? Premier Pabst Co v. Gross cup (1936). 20. Can a Trial Court issue an Order that is inconsistent with Petitioner Final . Judgment and thereby constitutes a material Breach in the substantive adjudicative portions of said Judgment? In re Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 40 S. Ct 239, 240, 64. 21. Isn't a "severe" mental illness is one "that has caused significant disruption in an inmate's everyday life and which prevents his functioning in the general , population without disturbing or endangering others or himself.” Tilley v. Owens, . 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1286 (W.D. Pa. 1989) aff'd 907 F. 2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990). | 22. Recently three members of the Court, in concurring or dissenting opinions, | have raised the possibility of long-term solitary confinement's [Kennedy, Breyer, . _ and Ginsburg! In re Medley 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890). : | | 23. Pretrial detainees cannot be subjected to any conditions that constitute ' punishment "[flor under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be puni