Whether a 'subsequent replacement indictment' restarts the Speedy Trial Act clock or if 'superseding' indictments are automatically excluded

QUESTION PRESENTED The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., requires that a 30/70 day Clock be reset on the “filing and making public” of a “subsequent” indictment. The Act does not mention the “superseding” indictments over which Circuits are now split as to their correct definition and or whether such “subsequent” indictments are excluded. This chaotic state of affairs caused the trial Judge herein to docket a Judge-created subsequent indictment, then, four years later, delete it, then, docket it again, all : , while failing to acknowledge this sua sponte filing was a § 3161(d)(1) subsequent indictment, and, thus, concomitant plain error when failing to reset the 30/70 day Clock due merely to their having defined the word of art “superceding” to be in conflict with this Court’s precedent and that of their own supervising Circuit court. The question presented is: d) Whether (as the Eleventh Circuit holds), under § 3161(d)(1), a “subsequent replacement indictment” “restarts the clock regardless of how the prior indictment was dismissed,” or (as others hold), “superseding” indictments are automatically excluded; collaterally, whether the words of art “subsequent” > vis-a-vis “superseding” should be clarified in the context of § 3161(d)(1); and, 2) The judgments below automatically vacated due to plain errors self-evident : from the record under S.Ct. Rule 24(1)(a), or otherwise, e.g., failure to reset the STA Clock and thereby violate the Speedy Trial Act-Clause, Indictment of a Grand Jury Clause, Due Process Clause and Notice Clause, by docketing a § 3161(d)(1) indictment without acknowledging the reset concomitant 30/70 Day STA Clock, as required by § 3161(d)(1), and by U.S. v. Rojas-Contreras, : 474 U.S. 231 (1985), where two Supreme Court Justices concurred that, “the 30-day and 70-day periods were intended to operate in tandem”; as well as, 3) Constructive amendment of that [subsequent] indictment, by broadening the charges at trial, thereby circumventing the 5th Amendment Indictment of a Grand Jury Clause, among other plain errors. @