Whether Flowers's trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to present alibi evidence,whether Flowers presented sufficient proof of actual innocence,whether the trial court violated Flowers's due process rights by denying a mistrial after a witness referred to him as a parolee,whether the lower courts erred in dismissing Flowers's claims regarding denial of confidential attorney visits and the prosecutor's failure to disclose Brady evidence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Flowers was convicted of robbery, kidnapping and burglary based on an incident where two men robbed a massage parlor that had a history of prostitution. The only issue at trial was whether Flowers was correctly identified as one of the perpetrators. The questions presented are: 1. Under the clearly established rule in Strickland v. Washingon, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was Flowers’s trial counsel prejudicially ineffective when he failed to present evidence of Flowers’s alibi at trial? Relatedly, has Flowers presented sufficient proof of actual innocence as either a stand alone claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), and/or as a gateway to overcome any procedural default under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298(1995)? 2. Did the trial court violate Flowers’s right to due process when it denied his motion for a mistrial on grounds that a prosecution witness told the jury that, at the time of the charged incident, he was a parolee at large? 3. Should the courts below have issued a certificate of appealability as to the following claims: A. Whether the district court erroneously dismissed as procedurally defaulted Flowers’s claim that his right to counsel was violated because he had been denied an opportunity for meaningful confidential visits with his trial attorney? B. Whether the trial prosecutor violated Flowers’s right to due process of law under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when he failed to fully disclose impeachment evidence concerning one of the prosecutor’s most important witnesses?