Did the Georgia courts err by refusing to remedy appellate counsel's professionally deficient, and prejudicial, waiver of a claim for discretionary relief from Petitioner's conviction and life sentence, where the decision to waive rested on both an error of law and an irrational strategy?

QUESTION PRESENTED After Petitioner was convicted of murder in a Georgia Superior Court, his first appellate counsel sought reversal of the conviction in that same court, alleging that the verdict was “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence” and “contrary to the law and principles of justice and equity.” These contentions invoked two statutes that permit a Georgia trial judge broad discretion to reverse a conviction if she deems the verdict to be unfair or unreliable, a power that Georgia courts call the judge’s sitting as a “thirteenth juror.” When Petitioner’s Motion for New Trial came to be heard, however, new appellate counsel withdrew all asserted grounds for relief except for a claim that the evidence of Petitioner's guilt was insufficient as a matter of law — a much more difficult test for a convicted Defendant to meet. The trial judge granted the Motion for New Trial, but the Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to convict, and reversed. When appellate counsel countered, finally seeking thirteenth juror review in the Superior Court, the trial judge granted that motion as well, but the state supreme court again reversed, holding that Petitioner had impermissibly engaged in a piecemeal appeal. Petitioner’s state habeas corpus petition alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for having withdrawn her argument for thirteenth juror review. At a hearing on the Petition, counsel testified she had erroneously believed that the trial judge’s post-verdict ruling, holding the evidence of guilt legally insufficient, was not appealable by the prosecution. She had proceeded on that sole ground because she believed that prevailing thereon would conclusively end the case in Petitioner’s favor, whereas a thirteenth-juror reversal would subject him to retrial. The state habeas court endorsed counsel’s strategy as reasonable. It declined to address the question of prejudice, holding only that counsel had not performed deficiently. The Supreme Court of Georgia refused to review the denial of relief. The question presented is: Did the Georgia courts err by refusing to remedy appellate counsel’s professionally deficient, and prejudicial, waiver of a claim for discretionary relief from Petitioner’s conviction and life sentence, where the decision to waive rested on both an error of law and an irrational strategy? i