Whether a district court may exclude time pursuant to a stipulation between the parties without making on-the-record findings under the Speedy Trial Act

QUESTION PRESENTED The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 et seq., requires that a criminal information or indictment be filed within 30 days of a defendant’s arrest, subject to certain excludable delays. Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 203 (2010). In addition to certain enumerated automatic exclusions not at issue here, § 3161(h)(7) of the Act “permits a district court to grant a continuance and to exclude the resulting delay if the court, after considering certain factors, makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 498-99 (2006) (emphasis added). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings” reflecting that the district court considered factors specified in the Act and articulating “its reasons for finding that the ends of justice are served and they outweigh other interests[,] * * * there can be no exclusion” under § 3161(h)(7). Jd. at 506-07 (emphasis added). The question presented is: Whether, notwithstanding the plain language of § 3161(h)(%) of the Speedy Trial Act and this Court’s decision in Zedner, a district court may exclude time pursuant to a stipulation between the parties without making its own “on-the-record findings” that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the interests of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial. (I)