Does a state appellate court have a duty to resolve a federal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Federal performance/prejudice test?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW : . QUESTION 1 . During voir dire, my trial counsel repeatedly referred to me as a drug dealer, supplanting the prosecution with a motive that would never have survived New York’s prior bad acts and uncharged crimes protocols. My trial counsel failed to-object when a non-testifying ballistics examiner’s findings were improperly used to connect me to the weapon used in the offense. On dozens of gccasions, my trial counsel allowed the prosecution to spoon-feed the jury theories under the guise of “evidence”. Also, at sentencing, my trial counsel placed me at the scene of the homicide as one of three men who came to assassinate Mr. Mateo, the decedent in this case. Although presented with the two part performance prejudice standard under Strickland _v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department: completely ignored its constitutional duty to resolve my federal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and instead, used New. York’s meaningful representation standard, which omits Strickland’s Prejudice prong, and severely alters Strickland’s performance prong beyond recognition. Qla. Does a state appellate court have a duty to resolve a federal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Federal test? QIB. Is New York State’s meaningful representation standard equivalent to Strickland’s _ standard? If not, is New York’s meaningful representation standard sufficient in and of itself to resolve a defendant’s 6" Amendment claim , of ineffective assistance of counsel. QUESTION 2 . All of the main witnesses to see the shooter were Hispanic. None of them picked me out as the shooter, but instead, consistently picked out Mr. Michael Soto, the drug dealer who lived next door to the victim. To overcome this key flaw in their case, during the district attorney’s summation, the prosecutor used an “all Hispanics look alike” strategy to explain away why the people picked Mr. Michael Soto instead of me. To combat this prejudicial claim, my trial counsel requested that the jury be charged with an intra-racial identification charge, explaining : the reliability of intra-racial identification. Despite the years of expert findings and case law supporting the charge, the trial court denied the charge, and the Appellate Division upheld the . denial. Q2a. Did the denial of the charge deprive me of the right to present an adequate defense? : Q2b. Is there a need to have an intra-racial charge in cases such as this? : ' * . . Q2c. Is it time that this Court update its holdings in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) and Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012) to reflect the over thirty years of scientific studies affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification? QUESTION 3 ; The prosecutor withheld key Brady material for months before being forced to hand it over to the : defense. The prosecutor frequently circumvented the rules of evidence and skirted the county court’s pre-trial rulings in a desperate attempt to divert the jury’s attention away from the witnesses’ identifications that pointed to Michael Soto, the drug dealer next door. During ‘summation, the prosecutor contorted the evidence, pointing to the racist implications of one of its : detectives that all Hispanics look alike to explain away why so many witnesses identified Michael Soto instead of this writer, and constantly disparaged the performance of trial counsel. Q3a. In this purely circumstantial case, did the prosecutor’s misconduct satisfy the three part test for misconduct outlined in numerous precedent set by this Court, and did : the Appellate Division, Fourth Department violate the Supremacy Clause when it failed to properly utilize the evaluation criteria that would have resulted in the granting of my appellate counsel’s application for reversal? : : : Q3b. What was the appropriate sanction for the prosecutor’s numerous blatant and. , . purposeful B