Whether Halprin's second federal petition raising a judicial bias claim is 'second or successive' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) if the judge concealed his bias by failing to recuse himself, and the public exposure of his bigotry after the conclusion of Halprin's initial habeas proceedings in the district court created Halprin's first fair opportunity to present his claim?

QUESTION PRESENTED In May 2018, after the district court denied Randy Halprin’s first federal habeas petition, the Dallas Morning News published a story about Halprin’s trial judge titled “White, Straight and Christian: Dallas County candidate admits rewarding his kids if they marry within race.” In the article, the judge admitted that he created an anti-miscegenation clause in a living trust. The article also quoted a 2006 campaign aide for the Judge who said the judge regularly used the word “nigger” around her, and referred to cases involving black defendants as “T.N.D.s” for “Typical Nigger Deals.” The article did not mention Halprin (who is white and Jewish), his case, his codefendants, or the judge’s attitude towards Jews. Halprin interviewed the campaign aid and other people close to the judge. He discovered that the judge who presided over his capital trial in 2008 called him a “goddamn kike” and “fuckin’ Jew,” and called his Latino co-defendants “wetbacks.” The judge believed he had been selected to try their cases to “insure [syd that the guilty were punished,” and said about the trials, “From the wetback to the Jew, they knew they were going to die.” In May 2019, Halprin presented his judicial bias claim in a second federal petition. It was uncontested below that the judge was biased and had a constitutional, statutory, and ethical duty to recuse himself. But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Halprin’s judicial bias claim was barred as successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) because the claim “ripened” in 2008, when the judge presided over the trial, even if the judge’s anti-Semitic bias was “unknown to Halprin at the time.” The question presented is: Whether Halprin’s second federal petition raising a judicial bias claim is “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) if the judge concealed his bias by failing to recuse himself, and the public exposure of his bigotry after the conclusion of Halprin’s initial habeas proceedings in the district court created Halprin’s first fair opportunity to present his claim? i