Did the Ninth Circuit's disposition of Petitioners' Batson claim conflict with the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit?

question presented is as follows: Did the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of Petitioners’ Batson claim, _ which minimized the constitutional import of the government prosecutor’s offer to empanel an African-American venire member, provided that he could peremptorily strike another African-American venire member, conflict with the Second Circuit’s contrary approach in United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002), and the Sixth Circuit’s in Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242 (6" Cir. 2011)? 2. It is well-established under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that a defendant in a criminal case has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial. But the Court has never addressed the standard of review that a federal court of appeals should apply when adjudicating a Faretta claim on direct appeal. Nor has it discussed how a district court should adjudicate an untimely . asserted request to proceed pro se while the trial already is in progress. -prefix The questions presented are as follows: a. Did the Ninth Circuit’s disposition, which ostensibly applied a | clear-error standard of review to the district court’s denial of Petitioners Marcus Foreman’s and Terry Carry Hollins’s Faretta claims, conflict with every other | federal court of appeals that has articulated a standard of review in this context? b. . Did the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of Petitioner Wilbert Ross, III’s asserted Faretta claim, precluding it categorically because it was time-barred, conflict with the multi-factor balancing tests that the First, Second, Third, Seventh, . and Tenth Circuits have adopted? 3. In Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the Court held that prisoners serving a custodial sentence do not have any reasonable expectation of | privacy in their cells for Fourth Amendment purposes. But the Court has never . addressed Hudson’s applicability to pretrial detainees. | The question presented is as follows: Did the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of Petitioners Foreman’s and ‘. . Hollins’s Fourth Amendment claim, arising from state actors’ inserting a , warrantless recording device in their pretrial detention cell, conflict with the . Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1986), SO . which held that Hudson does not apply to pretrial detainees, and state actorsto -prefix search detainees’ cells unless they can identify facility-related reasons for the . search? 4. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US. 466, 490 (2000), the Court held that under the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial clause, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” But notwithstanding that categorical rule, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the district court’s having made extensive findings of fact in this multi-defendant’s RICO conspiracy case to clarify a deficient special verdict form — namely, one that did not allow the jury to make particular findings regarding the precise predicate acts that Petitioners allegedly intended to commit that carry a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d) & 1963(a). The questions presented are as follows: : a. Did the Ninth Circuit’s opinion conflict with Apprendi, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), and their respective progeny by implicitly holding it is consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee . _ —and the jury’s concomitant responsibility to make findings beyond a reasonable doubt — in a-multi-defendant conspiracy case to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), when the special verdict form did not . -prefix permit the jury to make findings regarding the specific predicate acts attributable to each defendant? b. — Did the Ninth Circuit’s Apprendi-related holding conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Nguyen, 255 F.3d 1335 (11" Cir. 2001), that vacated a district court’s sentence exceeding the statutory