Is equitable tolling warranted when access to legal files and resources is severely hampered?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1) a. Is equitable tolling warranted when access to legal files and resources is severely hampered? Where the 4th Circuit has denied equitable tolling for circumstances that would warrant tolling according to the 7th Circuit standard in Socha v. Boughton, is there a circuit split or need for uniform clarification? b. Did the 4th Circuit ignore the Supreme Court in Holland v. Florida, which states that there is a presumption in favor of equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of limitations? 2) a. Is the test of materiality of new evidence to allow the filing of a 2255 petitionethat the new evidence must prove innocence at trial? b. Does Kyles v. Whitley govern materiality of new evidence to allow a 2255 petition? c. Is the at-trial test of materiality inappropriate to a case where a plea was taken? Should the District Court have used a Hill v. Lockhart inquiry as the test of materiality? d. Is either an at-trial test or Hill v. Lockhart inquiry appropriate to evidence supporting a claim of fraud upon the court, where the issue is a violation of due process? 3) Are District Court judges entitled to rely on affidavits of respondents in denying an evidentiary hearing of a 2255 proceeding? Are District Court judges required to follow the rules of procedure for 2255? Is due process denied when the District Court does not follow the rules? 4 4) a. Did the District Court grossly misapply the 4th Circuit case of U.S. v. Dyess to Petitioner's attorney's complete lack of investigation? Is conducting an investigation that uncovers no excubpatory evidence the same as conducting no investigation at all? b. Is the 4th Circuit case of U.S. v. Dyess consistent with Strickland? 5) Is the belief that a witness is a “cooperating witness", by itself, a valid exception to defense counsel's Strickland duty to interview all witnesses who may have information on the guilt or innocence of the defendant? 6) a. Did the District Court abuse it's discretion by wrongly finding ; that Petitioner's allegation of prosecutorial misconduct and fraud upon the court was unfounded and mere speculation? b. Was Petitioner required to submit evidence supporting his case in order to require an evidentiary hearing, or was it enough that the allegations in his 2255 motion were clearly-stated? 7) +a. Did the District Court abuse it's discretion by an over-reliance _ on Rule 11 as a per se rule? ; b. Is Lemaster correctly applied by the District Court? Are clearly-stated allegations of extraordinary ¢ircumstances sufficient to meet the non-absence requirement of Lemaster, or must a Petitioner also prove the allegation with evidence prior to being granted an evidentiary hearing? Q@estions Presented 2 t 8) a. Does the combination of Miller v. United States and Raines v. United States, as presented by the District Court, create an evidentiary requirement that violates Supreme Court precedent and §2255 rules? Is a Petitioner required to prove the clearly-stated allegations in his or her 2255 motion prior to being granted an evidentiary hearing? b. Did the District Court mistate and misapply the cases of Miller and Raines to create an unfair bar for petitioners to receive an evidentiary hearing? ec. Is a petitioner, in a collateral attack of a plea agreement, required to disprove "facts" which are not in the plea agreement? Is it enough that a petitioner Udsprovess"facts" which are stated in the plea agreement? Conversely, when a judge insists that a petitioner must prove a point which the plea already acknowledges, has the judge made an error and, thus, abused discretion? Questions Presented 3