Did the lower courts err by relying on a false accusation listed in the PSR, that was verified as false, as the sole basis for not only imposing a statutory maximum of 30 years in prison instead of the recommended 17 years, but then to conclude no prejudice could be shown for § 2255 relief because of that erroneous PSR entry that counsel failed to properly challenge? Should a higher standard of proof apply in such a situation to determine whether to use such conduct at sentencing, as Watts suggested but did not answer?

QUESTION PRESENTED In United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 148 (1997), this Court left open the question of whether a higher standard of proof should apply when a sentencing court relies on uncharged or acquitted conduct to "dramatically increase" a sentence. With this history in mind, Mr. Simon presents the following — , question: Did the lower courts err by relying on a false accusation listed in the PSR, that was verified as false, as the sole basis for not only imposing a statutory maximum of 30 years in prison instead of the recommended 17 years, but then to conclude no prejudice could be shown for § 2255 relief because of that erroneous PSR entry that counsel failed to properly challenge? Should a higher standard of proof apply in such a situation to determine whether to use such conduct at sentencing, as Watts suggested but did not answer? Li re ra :