No. 19-653

Theresa Ortloff v. Dave Trimmer, et al.

Lower Court: Ninth Circuit
Docketed: 2019-11-20
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response Waived
Tags: connick-v-myers due-process first-amendment first-amendment-speech-public-interest-connick-v-m free-speech procedural-due-process public-employee public-employee-speech public-interest speech whistleblower-protection
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw SocialSecurity ERISA DueProcess FirstAmendment LaborRelations Jurisdiction
Latest Conference: 2020-01-10
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Must the entire record, including motives, main thrust of the speech, and all instances of speech be reviewed under Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 1388 (1983) to determine if there is a public interest associated with the speech under the First Amendment?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Must the entire record, including motives, main thrust of the speech, and all instances of speech be reviewed under Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 1388 (1983) to determine if there is a public interest associated with the speech under the First Amendment? 2. Does Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) require a public employee to protect a large class of persons to be protected under the First Amendment when the employee criticizes an illegal pay padding scheme and an inefficient record keeping system in an attempt to help junior employees? 3. Is criticism of an inefficient public employee record keeping system, such as paper notes kept by a dispatcher showing work assignments and availabilities, speech protected by the First Amendment? 4. Does placement of a public employee on a blacklist that violates state law, such as the Do Not Hire/Dispatch List, violate Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment? 5. Does placement of a public employee on a blacklist that violates state law, after the employee criticizes shorting the pay of junior employees and inefficient recordkeeping systems, constitute retaliation under the First Amendment? ii 6. When an illegal blacklist subsequently causes an employee to not be dispatched after the employee is rehired under a collective bargaining agreement, does the constructive discharge constitute retaliation under the First Amendment and a violation of Substantive Due Process? 7. When a Federal Court interprets the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement phrase, such as a “bona fide” reason for termination, must it consider practice, usage, and custom of the term, and determine if it is vague under standard contract interpretation rules? 8. Does a collective bargaining agreement create a property right for purposes of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment where the state agencys employment specialist earlier rules unavailabilities and comments from supervisors limited the decision maker and could not form the basis for terminating the employee? 9. Is Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment violated when a probationary employee with a property right in the job is sent a termination letter without notice or opportunity to respond to the _ disciplinary allegations? 10. Is Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment violated when a probationary employee with a property right in the job is terminated without having any disciplinary charges brought from the written code of conduct and progressive disciplinary procedure? iii 11. Is the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause violated when most of the alleged unavailabilities used for termination are shown to be false or double counted, and less in number than other similarly situated employees who were not terminated? 12. Does a government manager violate the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining and distributing a blacklist in violation of a state anti-blacklisting law, where the blacklist prevents a re-hired public employee from being dispatched and constructively discharged? 13. Does a government manager violate the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by sending an internal e-mail that is then leaked to the Press which makes adverse comments about the whistleblower in an attempt to deflect blame for Press criticism of unsupported raises for the managers? 14. Is a party required to first determine if emails are reasonably accessible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) before the party can limit discovery and production of the e-mails under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33(a)(1) and 34(a)(1)(A) with search terms? 15. Is the test for whether electronically stored information is “reasonably accessible” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) an objective test and if so, are e-mails that have been located, read, and collated “reasonable accessible”? iv B.

Docket Entries

2020-01-13
Petition DENIED.
2019-12-18
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/10/2020.
2019-12-16
Waiver of right of respondent Dave Trimmer, et al. to respond filed.
2019-11-19
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due December 20, 2019)

Attorneys

Dave Trimmer, et al.
Anne Elizabeth EgelerAttorney General's Office, Respondent
Anne Elizabeth EgelerAttorney General's Office, Respondent
Theresa Ortloff
Shawn G. HartHart Law Office PLLC, Petitioner
Shawn G. HartHart Law Office PLLC, Petitioner