Is it unconstitutional for any Court to deny the Constitutional right to testify in one's own defense by placing the burden of making such desire known to the court on the criminal defendant when he is represented by counsel who knows that the defendant explicitly wants to testify?

QUESTION PRESENTED A criminal defendant is afforded very few decisions where he is the sole decision maker: whether he will have a jury trial, whether he will represent himself, how he will plead, and whether he will testify in his own defense. “The right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the Constitution. It is one of the rights that ‘are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987), citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975); see also U.S. Constitution amend. VI, XIV. Of the few decisions that are left up to the defendant, the most essential is the defendant’s right to testify in his own defense. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (“Even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of which was found to be ‘necessarily implied by the structure if the Amendment,’ ibid., is an accused’s right to present his own version of events in his own words.”). The right to testify is the most fundamental — yet there is no inquiry when a defendant seeks to waive the right to testify. Here, trial counsel misrepresented to the trial court Fry’s desire to testify. Because of that misrepresentation, the trial court did not ask Fry — on the record — whether or not be desired to testify. In light of that history, this case presents the following question: Is it unconstitutional for any Court to deny the Constitutional right to testify in one’s own defense by placing the burden of making such desire known to the court on the criminal defendant when he is represented by counsel who knows that the defendant explicitly wants to testify?