Is the Sentencing Commission's delegated authority over retroactive sentence reduction proceedings constrained by the general purposes of the Commission and the aims of sentencing as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 28 U.S.C. § 991(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 994?

QUESTION PRESENTED Upon approval of retroactive amendments to the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission has authority to promulgate binding policy statements to govern sentence reduction proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In 2011, the Sentencing Commission changed its policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 to disqualify defendants who received sentences below the Guidelines range from receiving consideration for retroactive sentence reductions, while making defendants who received within or even above Guidelines sentences fully eligible. Although recognizing that the new policy created sentencing disparities, the Ninth Circuit in the present case rejected both statutory and constitutional challenges to the Commission’s policy statement, holding that the Commission is “not constrained” by general sentencing statutes in the context of retroactive sentence reductions. This case presents important questions regarding the substantive limits of the Commission’s authority: Is the Sentencing Commission’s delegated authority over retroactive sentence reduction proceedings constrained by the general purposes of the Commission and the aims of sentencing as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 28 US.C. § 991(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 994? Under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause, does the exclusion of defendants who established grounds for variance or departure at their original sentencings from eligibility for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) fail rational basis scrutiny because the discrimination neither furthers nor is connected in scope to a legitimate government purpose?