Question 1:
In a Section 1983 false-evidence claim, which involves the creation, use, and
continued dissemination of fabricated evidence and upon which false accusations
were &/or are based, does the statute of limitations begin to run upon the favorable
termination of the ensuing proceedings, as recently held in McDonough v. Smith,
(2019), or from when the falsely accused "knew or should No. 18-485, 588 U. S.
have known " of the of that falsified, as held herein by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals (Appendix A3), particularly:
where the main harms thereby caused were not the long term deprivations of i-)
physical liberty, as they were in McDonough v. Smith, supra, &/or where the
violations resulted in harms that were primarily "interests other than the interest
in freedom from physical restraint. " Albright v. Oliver. 510 U.S. 266, 283 (1994);
&/or
when whether a given resolution, if any, in false-evidence Section 1983 ii.)
claims should be considered a "favorable termination, " as initially established in
Heck v, Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994), where the primary causal harms are not
liberty deprivations, is presently uncertain, undetermined, and warrants redress
and clarification by the U. S. Supreme Court. McDonough v. Smith, n. 2, supra-,
&/or
iii.) when the falsely accused has consistently been denied all access to that
which was falsified &/or its' contents, in ostensible regards to herself, and, as such,
she has no first-hand knowledge of that upon which said false accusations were
based, i.e. she has only occasionally and inadvertently overheard bits and pieces
thereof from various third parties, etc., rendering it impossible for her to defend
such; &/or
iv.) where the long term dissemination of said false evidence is so egregious as to
shock the conscience, given that the Respondents ' only purpose was &/or is to cause
harm unrelated to any legitimate legal purpose, thereby violating the Petitioner 's
Substantive Due Process Rights, et al., as established by County of Sacramento v.
Lewis. 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998), Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 (1952); &/or
as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as well as the United States v.)
District Court, Western District of New York, have entered decisions &/or
sanctioned such (Appendix A & Appendix B), that "so far departfed] from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, " i.e. rewarding the criminals
herein, i.e. the Respondents, and further victimizing the actual crime victim, i.e. the
Petitioner, that it "califs] for an exercise of this Court 's Supervisory Power, "
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10 (a).

Question 2:
Should the United States Supreme Court grant Writ of Certiorari to said
Petitioner, and review the false-evidence Section 1983 matter herein:
i.) in order to clarify whether a particular "resolution " should be considered a
"favorable termination, " as initially established in Heck v

Whether the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 false-evidence claim begins to run upon the favorable termination of the ensuing proceedings or from when the falsely accused 'knew or should have known' of the falsified evidence