Where through breach of the fiduciary; no cause has ever been tried on the merits, no adversary trial has ever been provided, no decision has ever been made of the issue in the case, and judgment was obtained through wilfully keeping plaintiffs in ignorance of all cause while charging notice and the fundamental unfair use of evidence: Would denial of Supreme court review as well as dismissal of plaintiffs' appeal 'in part' and/or in whole be in discord with the Federal rules established regarding extrinsic fraud in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) and a violation of plaintiffs' and the State judiciary's guaranteed Constitutional rights under the United States and California constitution?

Questions presented I. Where through breach of the fiduciary; no cause has ever been tried on the merits, no adversary trial has ever been provided, no decision has ever been made of the issue in the case, and judgment was obtained through wilfully keeping plaintiffs in ignorance of all cause while charging notice and the fundamental unfair use of evidence: Would denial of Supreme court review as well as dismissal of plaintiffs’ appeal ‘in part’ and/or in whole be in discord with the Federal rules established regarding extrinsic fraud in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) and a violation of plaintiffs’ and the State judiciary’s guaranteed Constitutional rights under the United States and California constitution? A. Where judgment[s} conflict with rules on cause preclusion established in Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc. 359 F. 3d 1136 (2004) Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, and the State court case Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1591, 27 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1st Dist. 1990); and related judgment{[s] conflict with the Thompson “no evidence rule” in Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)]: Would a bill in equity accrue owed to plaintiffs and the State judiciary [by defendants as benefactors of their fundamental unfair use of evidence in obtaining judgement] according to the admitted except to the general rule established in United States vs. Throckmorton through invocation of the rules of Harmless error established in Chapman v. California (1967) No. 95 and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 1963 when defendants fail to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt their fundamental unfair use of evidence did not make continual presumptive effect on all judgment[s] contributing to the continual unfair conviction of plaintiffs? i.) Where plaintiffs and the State were unjustly deprived of the guaranteed constitutional right to protect; life, liberty, due process and against illegal seizures when plaintiffs were deprived of a trial on the merits and the State was deprived of the constitutional right to provide that trial: Can plaintiffs and the State sustain a due process challenge proximately caused by defendants? ; L : B. According to the ‘admitted except to the general rule’ in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, (1878): how can judgement{s] be set aside and or vacated when due to presumption of prejudice in the judiciary; none of plaintiffs’ evidence has ever been properly considered by any trial court? II. Where pursuant to guaranteed constitutional rights, rules of extrinsic fraud established in United States v.Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) and rules on ‘stating a claim’ in Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1988); just cause emerges in facially available judicial admissions through questions of applicable law in a ‘