Whether the Fair Housing Act's proximate-cause element requires more than just some 'logical bond' between a statutory violation and the claimed injury

QUESTION PRESENTED In its prior decision in this case, this Court held that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) requires proof of proximate cause in the same way as other federal statutes with common-law roots. Following the relevant “directness principles,” the Court held, generally limits recovery to injury at the “first step” of the causal chain. Bank of America v. City of Miami, 1378. Ct. 1296 (2017). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit held that the governing “directness principles” do not limit the length of the causal chain, but instead require only some “logical bond” or “meaningful and _ logical continuity” between a statutory violation and the claimed injury. Miami alleges that the terms of loans made to individual borrowers led, through a lengthy causal chain, to lost tax revenue. The Eleventh Circuit held that claim sufficiently “direct.” The question presented is: Whether, under this Court’s decisions in this and other proximate-cause cases, the FHA’s proximatecause element requires more than just some “logical bond” between a statutory violation and the claimed injury.