Whether the Government is entitled to absolute deference regarding its decision to dismiss an FCA action under section 3730(c)(2)(A), or whether the qui tam relator should be granted the right to demonstrate that the Government's rationale for dismissal is 'fraudulent, illegal, or arbitrary and capricious'

QUESTION PRESENTED The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting the Government’s motion to dismiss this action pursuant to the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3730(¢)(2)(A). In doing so the D.C. Circuit described a split among the circuits regarding their treatment of such motions by the Government. The order specifically stated The False Claims Act “givels] the government an unfettered right to dismiss [a qui tam] action,” citing Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The order also stated that the D.C. Circuit “declined to adopt the standard of the Ninth Circuit, under which the Government must initially show that dismissal is ‘rationally related to a valid purpose,’ after which the relator bears the burden to show the decision to dismiss is ‘fraudulent, illegal, or arbitrary and capricious.” citing United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998)). (App.2a) THUS, THE QUESTION PRESENTED Is: Whether the Government is entitled to absolute deference regarding its decision to dismiss an FCA action under section 3730(c)(2)(A), or whether the qui tam relator should be granted the right to demonstrate that the Government’s rationale for dismissal is “fraudulent, illegal, or arbitrary and capricious.”