Isn't the erroneous admission of racially charged prejudicial evidence a structural error requiring automatic reversal or, at a minimum, one that requires analysis under a constitutional harmless error rule and not the traditional harmless error rule?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Court of Appeals agreed that the District Court erred when at petitioner’s trial for credit union robbery it permitted over objection one of the credit union employees to testify that her presence during the robbery left her with a “fear of groups of black men.” 921 F.3d 320, 330 (2d Cir. 2019). The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that such testimony “carried a substantial risk of evoking racial bias,” its relevance was minimal and its admission was therefore erroneous. Id. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals applying the harmless error rule for nonconstitutional errors refused to reverse petitioner’s conviction concluding that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the error was not harmless. Id. “(Violations of certain constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless error analysis because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). One Circuit Court and one state court of last resort agree. Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978); State v. Thompson, 233 So.38d 529, 562-563 (La. 2017). Moreover, even if a harmless error analysis applies, the harmless error rule applicable to constitutional violations should apply. This Court should grant review to decide this question of constitutional import over which the United States courts and state courts of last resort are divided: Isn’t the erroneous admission of racially charged prejudicial evidence a structural error requiring automatic reversal or, at a minimum, one that requires analysis under a constitutional harmless error rule and not the traditional harmless error rule? i