Whether the order of disbarment should be reversed, remanded, or vacated and set aside for violation of the Due Process and Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED For fifty-three years under this Court’s precedent in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967,) lawyers cannot be disbarred for exercising their privilege. against selfincrimination. Moreover, an adverse inference must be drawn from proven facts. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). This court also held in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), that lawyers are entitled to notice, and full and fair litigation in attorney discipline proceedings. The Supreme Court of Georgia order of ' disbarment by virtue of default for exercising Fifth Amendment privilege is in direct conflict with Spevack, Leary and Ruffalo. Moreover, the Georgia Bar failed to give : notice of charges of misconduct, denied full and fair litigation, plus fabricated a story that the petitioner lied to three tribunals even though none of the courts issued orders, statements, hearing records, or directives or ever claimed dishonesty or fraud upon the court. Plus, she fully responded to discovery [App. C and G] 1. Does this Court’s opinion in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), In ~ re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), and North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) require that the order of disbarment be reversed, remanded, or vacated and set aside for violation of the Due Process and Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment under the U.S. and Georgia Constitution. iii 2. Whether the State Bar of Georgia disciplinary proceedings comport — . with the Petition Clause of the First Amendment? ; 3. Whether the proper standard for taking the Fifth Amendment in “quasi-criminal” attorney disciplinary proceedings authorize an . adverse inference that the disciplinary allegations charged by the State are true, especially where the record is devoid of evidence. 4. Whether the Supreme Court of Georgia abused its discretion in examining what it means for attorney disciplinary cases to be “quasicriminal” in nature when it comes to Fifth Amendment rights. 5. Whether Georgia’s attorney discipline procedures (use of conflicted prosecutors, investigators, special masters and review board panelist aka active market participants, suspensions, collateral . estoppel, standard of proof, rules of evidence, discovery, full and fair opportunity to be heard and to litigate and default judgement) comport to constitutional due process standards. : 6. Whether the Supreme Court of Georgia abused its discretion when it failed to protect the petitioner from abuse by the State Bar of Georgia and their active market participants under the federal constitutional standard for enforcement of professional misconduct where the procedures lack uniformity and subjects’ attorneys to arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory enforcement and divergence . from national standards or no standards at all. iv 7. Whether the State Bar of Georgia’s formal complaint, report and recommendation, and order of disbarment by virtue of default should be reversed, dismissed or vacated for failure to comply with the requirements of the State Bar of Georgia’s Professional Code of Conduct Rule 4-213 and 4-219 hearing provisions, and Georgia law governed by O.G.G.A. 15-19-32 authorizing a trial by jury.