Whether the Seventh Circuit's treatment of pro se litigants was correct

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I, Hye-Young Park, pro se, refer to myself as “Park” hereinafter. As former Judge Richard Posner problematizes the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s treatment of pro se litigants, claiming “[t]he underlying problem [of the Seventh Circuit] is the downright indifference of most judges to the needs of pro se’s Ale Park’s petition draws national attention to the Seventh Circuit’s unjust responses to her appeal as a pro se, concerning sexual violence and retaliation on campus. Park poses five questions regarding whether the decisions of the Seventh Circuit in her appeals were correct as a matter of facts and law.2 Through them, Park’s petition questions whether being a pro se litigant played a part in the Seventh Circuit’s wrongful decisions, and represents other pro se litigants who have received, and will continue to receive unjust outcomes but for the help of the Supreme Court. This case concerns almost 9 years of Park’s agony and suffering. Question 1: Whether the Seventh Circuit’s three orders (rejecting, denying, and : not responding to Park’s petition and motions) relevant to “Petition for Rehearing” are correct in the following circumstances: 1 See Richard A. Posner, Reforming the Federal Judiciary: My Former Court Needs to Overhaul Its Staff Attorney Program and Begin Televising Its Oral Arguments (2017). At 31. In this book, Posner compares the procedures and performance of all thirteen circuits. Posner published the book right after he suddenly resigned after thirty-six years on the Seventh Circuit mainly due to his disagreement over other judges’ treatment of pro se litigants. 2 The Seventh Circuit ruled on important federal questions based on erroneous factual findings. I , ; After noticing that Order #74, 18-3017 is founded on many erroneous factual findings, Park filed her “Petition for Panel Rehearing,” which met the 3,900 word limit (Petition #76, 18-3225). The Seventh Circuit, however, rejected her petition due to an issue with the word count (Order #84, 18-3017). Park then filed her “Motion to Vacate the Order: This Court has overlooked or misapprehended the situation in which Park certified 3,900 words” (Motion #79, 18-3225). The Seventh Circuit swiftly denied the motion without any explanation (Order #86, 18-3017). Park subsequently filed her “Motion for Clarification of where Park has been wrong and Reconsideration for Order #86, 18-3017” (Motion #83, 18-3225). The Seventh Circuit returned the motion to Park without court action. (Order #84-1, 18-3225). Question 2: Whether the Seventh Circuit denying Park’s appeal of her Count XAssault claim is correct in the following circumstances: Robert Stake admitted that he had assaulted Park by attempting to kiss her before he forcefully kissed her in 2013; his assaults in 2011 and 2012 led to Count X-Assault claim. However, Count X was suddenly dismissed during the trial when the District Court applied Illinois’ two-year statute of limitations. Park appealed the dismissal, addressed how Stake’s assaults tie into his forceful kiss in her opening brief; and argued in her reply brief that the two-year limitation does not apply. The Seventh Circuit did not allow Park to address her Count X claim in her reply brief by considering it as a new issue/argument. Park filed her motion to allow her Count X claim in her appeal; but it was denied. It Question 3: Whether the Seventh Circuit’s dismissal of critical issues is correct in the following circumstances: Order #74, 18-3017 does not address any of the issues that Park raised in her appeal including all the issues against Charles Secolsky, against Stake where the District Court’s rulings in favor of Stake were founded on his lies; and against whether the District Court’s denial of Park’s post-trial motions (of correcting misstatements and supplementing omitted evidence) is correct under FRAP Rule 10(e). Instead, Order #74 only states that Park’s remaining arguments have no merit. Q