Whether the execution of an intellectually disabled defendant whose death sentence stands due to a federal court's misinterpretation of state law governing intellectual disability claims violates the Eighth Amendment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Timothy Richardson’s death penalty case raises a significant issue of national importance: whether our criminal justice system tolerates the execution of an intellectually disabled defendant whose death sentence stands undisturbed because federal review of his case rests on a misinterpretation of state law governing intellectual disability claims. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of the intellectually disabled). During Richardson’s initial federal habeas proceedings, both the federal district court, Richardson v. Branker, 769 F.Supp. 2d 896 (E.D.N.C 2011) and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit , Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128 (4 Cir. 2012) erroneously interpreted North Carolina’s statute prohibiting execution of intellectually disabled defendants; both courts interpreted the statute as a bright line rule by which a defendants seeking to qualify as intellectually disabled must register an IQ score of “70 or below” without consideration of the clinically accepted standard error of measurement. Because Richardson registered scores of 73 and 74, the district and circuit courts refrained from addressing his §2254[28 U.S.C. §2254] habeas claim that the state postconviction court’s assessment of Richardson’s adaptive functioning was an unreasonable determination of fact. i Importantly, after Richardson’s initial federal habeas review was final, in 2015 a North Carolina state court clarified North Carolina’s intellectual disability statute, holding: 19. The North Carolina Supreme Court has not interpreted North Carolina's statute to preclude consideration of the standard error of measurement or to limit the introduction of evidence if the threshold showing of an IQ score below 70 has not been met. Therefore, North Carolina's statute, like the Florida statute, can be and has been in this case specifically interpreted consistently with Atkins. Order of the Hon. Quentin T. Sumner, Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, June 16, 2015. Pet. Appx. 42, 46 This clarification of state law clearly demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the federal district and circuit courts initial review of Richardson’s habeas petition, for both the district court and the Fourth Circuit proceeded under the erroneous premise that North Carolina’s intellectual disability statute imposed a strict IQ cutoff, and thus neither court reviewed an earlier state post-conviction court’s findings regarding Richardson’s adaptive deficits. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in 2019 the Fourth Circuit held that Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not provide a remedy for this defect, which clearly undermined the integrity of the earlier in the federal habeas proceedings. Richardson v Thomas, 930 F3d 587 (4* Cir. 2019) Pet. Appx A 1, rehearing den.. August 9, 2019, Pet. Appx. A51. The Fourth Circuit’s erroneous ruling creates an unacceptable risk of the federal court permitting the execution of a person with an intellectual disability, in ii defiance of the Eight Amendment prohibition set forth in Atkins. The present case raises significant issues that this Court should resolve, including whether: 1) The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals contravened this Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby in ruling that a “defect in the habeas proceedings,” as a matter of law, can only be a procedural error, and that Rule 60(b) relief is unavailable for any claim in which the district court previously reached the merits of a defendant’s federal habeas application? 2) The Fourth Circuit erred in failing to recognize that its previous misinterpretation of state law amounted toa defect undermining the integrity of earlier habeas rulings, and thus justified relief under Rule 60(b)(6)? iii