Does the due process clause's requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt obligate the government in a drug possession case to present evidence of an observable substance a jury could reasonably infer is a narcotic or an acknowledgment by the defendant of such possession?

Question Presented This case raises a fundamental question about the government’s burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The jury here convicted Fernando Duran of distributing and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine based on nothing more than a series of recorded phone calls in which he and his alleged co-conspirator employed so-called drug slang. But no actual drugs were observed, recovered, or tested; no search warrants were issued or executed; and no controlled buys were conducted. No one—not a single person—ever saw Mr. Duran in the presence of drugs. And at most, the recorded phone calls show nothing more than Mr. Duran referencing the possession of drugs by someone else or a plan to get drugs at some later date. Mr. Duran never acknowledged possessing cocaine himself. If due process is to mean anything, it must mean that the government’s case against Mr. Duran fell well short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The question this case presents is: Does the due process clause’s requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt obligate the government in a drug possession case to present evidence of an observable substance a jury could reasonably infer is a narcotic or an acknowledgment by the defendant of such possession. ii