No. 19-735

William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut v. Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority, et al.

Lower Court: Second Circuit
Docketed: 2019-12-10
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Response RequestedResponse WaivedRelisted (2)
Tags: federal-aviation-act federal-preemption political-subdivision preemption runway-length standing standing-to-sue state-regulation state-sovereignty supremacy-clause
Key Terms:
Arbitration DueProcess JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2020-03-20 (distributed 2 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Does a political subdivision of a State have standing to sue its creator State under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority (“Authority”) is a public instrumentality and political subdivision of the State of Connecticut created by legislation to operate Tweed-New Haven Airport (“Airport”), which is located on the border of the City of New Haven (“City”) and the Town of East Haven, Connecticut (“Town”). In 2009, the City, the Town and the Authority entered into an agreement limiting the length of a runway at the Airport to 5,600 linear feet. The agreement called for the state legislature to codify the runway length, which it did that same year by enacting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 15-120j(c) (the “Tweed-NH statute”). Six years later, the Authority and the City (collectively, “Respondents”) brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court against the State claiming that the statute was preempted by various federal laws and therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. The State filed a motion to dismiss challenging Respondents’ standing on the grounds that political subdivisions are barred from suing their creator States under the Supremacy Clause. The Second Circuit held that the Authority had standing to sue the State under the Supremacy Clause, and that Connecticut’s legislation limiting the length of the runway is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act because the statute “intrudes into the field of air safety.” The questions presented are: 1. Does a political subdivision of a State have standing to sue its creator State under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution? ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued 2. Does the Federal Aviation Act preempt a state law limiting the length of an airport runway, thereby depriving a State from determining the size and nature of a local airport?

Docket Entries

2020-03-23
Petition DENIED.
2020-02-27
Reply of petitioner William Tong filed.(Distributed)
2020-02-26
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 3/20/2020.
2020-02-10
Brief of respondents Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority, et al. in opposition filed.
2020-01-10
Response Requested. (Due February 10, 2020)
2019-12-30
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/17/2020.
2019-12-16
Waiver of right of respondent City of New Haven to respond filed.
2019-12-16
Waiver of right of respondent Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority to respond filed.
2019-12-06
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due January 9, 2020)
2019-09-27
Application (19A347) granted by Justice Ginsburg extending the time to file until December 6, 2019.
2019-09-24
Application (19A347) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from October 7, 2019 to December 6, 2019, submitted to Justice Ginsburg.

Attorneys

City of New Haven
Mark W. MosierCovington & Burling, LLP, Respondent
John RoseCity of Haven - Office of Corporation Counsel, Respondent
John RoseCity of Haven - Office of Corporation Counsel, Respondent
Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority
Mark W. MosierCovington & Burling, LLP, Respondent
Mark W. MosierCovington & Burling, LLP, Respondent
William Tong
Clare Elmendorf KindallOffice of the Attorney General, Petitioner
Clare Elmendorf KindallOffice of the Attorney General, Petitioner