No. 19-7375

Joaquin Mario Valencia-Trujillo v. United States

Lower Court: Eleventh Circuit
Docketed: 2020-01-22
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: circuit-split criminal-procedure ineffective-assistance-of-counsel sixth-amendment strickland-v-washington circuit-split constitutional-law contemporary-assessment criminal-defense ineffective-assistance ineffective-assistance-of-counsel legal-foreseeability sixth-amendment strickland-standard strickland-v-washington
Key Terms:
HabeasCorpus JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2020-02-21
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether Strickland's test for ineffective assistance of counsel incorporates an unsettled/foreshadowed exception

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In this Court's seminal decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court set forth the standard for determining whether a criminal defendant's counsel provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC"). Id. The standard set forth by the Court established a two-prong analysis requiring the courts to find both "cause’ and "prejudice" to warrant the vacatur of a conviction or sentence. Id. 466 U.S. at 687. To establish "cause," this Court has held that a criminal defendant is required to show that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" judged by "prevailing professional norms." Id. Coloring the Court's articulation of this standard is the fact that this court has emphasized that the "reasonableness" of counsel's performance is to be judged according to "an adopted rule of contemporary assessment," viewing counsel's conduct under the law existing at the time it was rendered. See Maryland v. Kulbicki, 136, S. Ct. 2,4 (2015)(citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993); See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In adopting this Standard, the Kulbicki Court held counsel can NOT be ineffective for failing to ; "predict" changes in law that were "settled" and "uncontroversial" at the time defense counsel had rendered his assistance. Id. The Kulbicki Court did NOT, however, decide whether counsel has a "general duty" to anticipate developments in the law that, though "unsettled," are clearly foreshadowed" by other circuit precedents and, therefore, should require "reasonable counsel" to raise such issues with the courts in order to maintain a baseline of attorney effectiveness in conformity with Strickland. The question of whether ; such a general duty exists as an exception to (or as a component of) Strickland's "rule of contemporary assessment" has divided the Courts of Appeals, with the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits finding a "foreshadowed'' exception and/or component to the contemporary assessment rule of Strickland, and the Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits conversely finding no such exception. In light of this Circuit split, the following questions are presented. 1. Whether, Despite Strickland's Contemporary Assessment Rule, Strickland's Test For Determining Whether A Criminal Defendant's Counsel Was Ineffective Incorporates An Exception Or Component Into Its IAC Analysis, As Held By The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, And Seventh Circuits, Or Whether Such A Rule Is Absolutely Barred By Strickland And Its Progeny As Held By The Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits? i 2. Whether Strickland's Interpretation Of The Sixth Amendment Imposes A General Duty On A Criminal Defendant's Counsel To Anticipate Developments In Law Where (a) The Law In Effect At The Time Of Counsel's Performance Is unsettled In The Circuit Where The Assistance Has Been Rendered, And (b) The development In Law Is Foreshadowed By Decisions In Other Circuits On The Same Issue Of Law? 3. Whether Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Secure Vicarious Standing From A Surrendering Country For Purposes Of Objecting To Violations Of An Extradition Agreement Where (a) The Law Of The Eleventh Circuit Was Unsettled On The Issue At The Time Counsel Rendered His Assistance, (b) Other Circuits Had Held Obtaining An Objection From A Surrendering Country Would Bestow A Criminal Defendant With Vicarious Standing To Object To Violations Of An Extradition Agreement To Which He Was Subject To, And (c) The Surrendering Country In This Case Later Lodged Objections With The United States Asserting Violations Of Extradition Agreement Made With The United States With Respect To The Petitioner? 4. Whether, In Light Of Colombia's Protests Asserting That The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Violates The Terms And Conditions Of Its Extradition Agreement In This Case, This Case Presents Questions Of Exceptional Importance Warranting T

Docket Entries

2020-02-24
Petition DENIED. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
2020-02-06
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/21/2020.
2020-01-28
Waiver of right of respondent United States to respond filed.
2020-01-15
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due February 21, 2020)

Attorneys

Joaquin Mario Valencia-Trujillo
Joaquin Mario Valencia-Trujillo — Petitioner
Joaquin Mario Valencia-Trujillo — Petitioner
United States
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent