Louis Taylor v. Pima County, Arizona, et al.
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Whether Heck applies to a former prisoner who lacked an opportunity to challenge his conviction through federal habeas while incarcerated
QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), this Court held that federal habeas corpus is the sole avenue by which a “state prisoner” may bring a claim that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Jd. at 487. In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), five Justices concluded that Heck has no application to a prisoner who has been “release[d] from custody” and who lacked an opportunity to raise his claims through federal habeas while incarcerated. Jd. at 19 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 25 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Louis Taylor was wrongfully imprisoned for 42 years. After compelling evidence of Taylor’s innocence—and of egregious prosecutorial misconduct at Taylor’s trial—came to light, the prosecution consented to the vacatur of Taylor’s conviction. But it insisted, as a condition of Taylor’s release, that he plead “no contest” to time served. The Ninth Circuit held that, under Heck, that no-contest plea barred Taylor from recovering any damages for his 42 years of wrongful incarceration. The questions presented are: 1. Whether Heck applies to a former prisoner who lacked an opportunity to challenge his conviction through federal habeas while incarcerated. 2. Whether Heck bars a plaintiff from recovering damages for his period of incarceration if the plaintiffs conviction has been vacated and he has been released from prison pursuant to a plea of “no contest” to time served. (i)