Whether the new rule announced in Johnson applies to the identical residual clause in the mandatory guidelines

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In 1996, when the guidelines were mandatory, Richard Lumpkin, was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. His career offender designation depended on the fact that he had prior convictions for California burglary and attempted burglary, which at the time qualified as a crime of violence only under the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). In 2015, this Court struck down as void for vagueness the identical residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of “violent felony” at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Within a year, Lumpkin filed a § 2255 motion challenging his career offender designation in light of the new rule announced in Johnson. But the district court dismissed the motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) as required by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017), in which it held that the new tule announced in Johnson does not apply to the mandatory guidelines unless and until this Court says So. The questions presented are: I. Whether, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), the new rule announced in Johnson applies to the identical residual clause in the mandatory guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2000)? Il. Whether the residual clause in the mandatory guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2000), is void for vagueness? i