Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in denying Petitioner's request to amend records and assert rights under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1) Whether the Fourth Circuit erred and disregarded this Court’s precedents when it denied Petitioner’s request to amend significantly incorrect records in the District . : Court for the limited purpose of asserting Petitioner’s right to proceedings that are free and fair under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments and common law. 2) Whether the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished ruling on Petitioner’s present matter creates differences from Third Circuit’s Precedential ruling on No. 13.3521, 27 Sept. 2016, in Millicent Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University No. 153521 Grd Cir.2017), which states: “We hold that, at the prima facie stage, a plaintiff need only proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse employment action, not the but-for reason.”, “We conchide that Nassar/( University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013)] does not alter the plaintiff's burden at the prima facie stage”. 3) Whether the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished ruling on Petitioner’s present matter creates differences from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999, Judge Gerald Tjoflat, explaining that, though Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination using the McDonnell Dougias method, Plaintiff may also more easily establish a case using traditional methods, also explained the importance of not exclusively relying on McDonnell Douglas in cases where there isn’t direct evidence, by providing a ii hypothetical in which factors for McDonnell Douglas wouldn’t be met even though discrimination could likely be found), the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Illinois Inc. 453 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 2006), . where Judge Posner found that there was no rich mosaic of circumstantial evidence, but there was “enough” circumstantial evidence to preclude summary ; judgment), and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions which touch the issue — which the opinions in Wright and Sylvester agree with — such as International ; Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), where US Supreme Court rejected employer’s assertion that McDonnell Douglas is the “only means of establishing a prima facie case of individual discrimination.”. : 4) Whether the Fourth Circuit’s affirmation of the District Court MSJ Order on October 24, 2018, reflects differences with the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 934 (11th Cir.1995) , where the ruling states: Proximity in time is sufficient to raise an inference of causation (the general rule is close temporal proximity between employee's protected conduct : and adverse employment action is sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact of a causal connection, with the exception that temporal proximity alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to causal connection where there is unrebutted evidence that the decision maker did not have knowledge that the employee engaged in protected conduct — : : , Respondents’ Counsel didn’t provide evidence the Managers were unaware of , | iii , Petitioner’s protected activity, and the SGT Inc. Dy. Program Manager : acknowledged on Feb. 22, 2016, that they were). ; 5) Given that the Fourth Circuit never formally acknowledged Petitioner’s request for additional words in an amended re-hearing petition, or the re-hearing petition itself dt. 08/01/2019 (the acknowledged original re-hearing petition was dt. 07/19/2019, and all these were submitted by 08/ 12/2019, due date for re-hearing petition): , Whether Fourth Circuit couldn’t apply Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 288-89 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting James v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 243 . Fed.Appx. 74, 79 (6th Cir.2007), and Halfacre v. Home Depot 221 Fed. Appx. 424, 433 (6th Cir. 2007), to determine whether P