Does 18 U.S.C. §249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(D) exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249, criminalizes, among other things, assaults based on the victim’s perceived sexual orientation. The Act sets forth several jurisdictional “circumstances” when it applies. The one at issue here makes it a federal crime to commit a biasmotivated assault if that conduct “interferes with commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § It does not require that the victim be engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and it does not require a substantial effect on commerce. Petitioner James Hill was charged under this jurisdictional prong for punching a co-worker. The question presented here has divided lower-court judges: Does 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(D) exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause?