Richard Kenneth Djerf v. David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections
DueProcess Punishment HabeasCorpus Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Did the panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals contravene this Court's precedents and create a split with other circuits when it affirmed the district court's decision that a trial court is not required to inquire, in a waiver of counsel colloquy, whether a defendant is being forced to choose between incompetent counsel and proceeding pro se when there is ample evidence in the record suggesting so?
QUESTION PRESENTED In a state capital murder case, the state prosecutor and trial court recognized on the record that trial counsel were not properly investigating and preparing the case for trial. Despite this, and in the face of notice from Mr. Djerf that he wanted to proceed pro se because his trial counsel were not properly preparing his case for trial and had not met with Mr. Djerf to discuss his case for approximately seven months, the trial court informed him during the waiver of counsel colloquy that he could proceed to trial with the same incompetent counsel who currently represented him or he could proceed to trial pro se. The trial court did not inform Mr. Djerf that he had a right to be represented by constitutionally adequate counsel at trial, nor did it properly inquire into Mr. Djerf’s reasons for waiving counsel to ensure that he was not being forced to choose between incompetent counsel and proceeding pro se. The question presented is: Did the panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals contravene this Court’s precedents and create a split with other circuits when it affirmed the district court’s decision that a trial court is not required to inquire, in a waiver of counsel colloquy, whether a defendant is being forced to choose between incompetent counsel and proceeding pro se when there is ample evidence in the record suggesting so? i