Does the mens rea principle apply to criminal prosecutions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015), this Court reaffirmed a long-standing principle under both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s Informed Clause, that criminal statutes must contain a mens rea element—with the exception of strict liability offenses. Furthermore, as Elonis explains, a “defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before he can be found guilty” of any offence in order to differentiate between lawful and unlawful conduct. Id. at 2009. Where a criminal statute is silent about scienter, a court must “read into” a criminal charge a mens rea element in its jury instructions as Elonis and its antecedents held, and as refined in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). Petitioner was convicted of five counts of violating 10 U.S.C. § 933, Article 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice, for “conduct unbecomirzg an officer.” The Question Presented is: Does this mens rea or scienter principle apply to criminal prosecutions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, where the underlying statute at issue, 10 U.S.C. § 933, contains no mens rea element and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held below that only a general intent was required using an objective, versus subjective standard, 1.e., negligence, and thus, no mens rea element need be instructed to the jury, even where the “conduct” alleged to be criminal, is facially non-criminal?