Is federal armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) when the offense fails to require any intentional use, attempted use, or threat of violent physical force?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Federal armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), is a general intent offense. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000). Decades of circuit precedent hold that intimidation under the statute is judged by the reasonable reaction of the victim, rather than by the defendant’s intent. This Court has ruled that the language found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(B)’s definition ofa “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019); see Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 (2018) (holding Immigration and Nationality Act’s “crime of violence” definition, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), void for vagueness). Following Johnson, Petitioner challenged his § 924(c) convictions on constitutional vagueness grounds asserting that the predicate offense, federal bank robbery, was not categorically a crime of violence. The district court denied relief, but granted Petitioner a certificate of appealability. After Petitioner filed his opening brief, the Circuit granted the government’s opposed motion for summary affirmance. The question presented is: Is federal armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) when the offense fails to require any intentional use, attempted use, or threat of violent physical force? i