Does the Ninth Circuit's conclusion—that the state court's dismissal of this claim without a hearing was reasonable—conflict with this Court's decision in Remmer, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) and its progeny, and with opinions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which require a hearing once there has been inappropriate third-party contact?

QUESTION PRESENTED Question 1: During deliberations, a juror contacted her preacher, who gave her an eye-for-an-eye Biblical passage, which made her “at peace” with voting for a death sentence. The state court dismissed these allegations without holding a hearing to allow the state to explain how that contact was not harmful. The question presented is this: Does the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion—that the state court’s dismissal of this claim without a hearing was reasonable—conflict with this Court’s decision in Remmer, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) and its progeny, and with opinions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals which require a hearing once there has been inappropriate thirdparty contact? Question 2: This is a death penalty case. Panah alleged in state and federal court that violations that occurred during the guilt phase—including the presentation of false testimony and trial counsel’s deficient him at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The Ninth Circuit assumed there were constitutional errors, but denied relief by finding the state court could have reasonably concluded the errors did not prejudice Panah at the guilt phase. The question presented is this: Does the Ninth Circuit’s complete failure to consider, the impact of any constitutional violation on the jury’s penalty verdict in a capital case conflict with this Court’s decision in Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009)? Question 3: Prosecution serologist William Moore testified that antigens found on evidence in Petitioner Hooman Panah’s bedroom were consistent with a mixture of biological fluids from the victim and Panah. The Ninth Circuit assumed that this testimony was false and that the prosecution knew it was false, based on the prosecution’s unpresented DNA testing indicating no such mixture. The Court was also troubled by defense counsel’s failure to investigate and expose that false testimony. However, the Ninth Circuit found the state court reasonably denied relief because “setting aside” Moore’s testimony the prosecution’s case was strong. The question presented is this: Does the Ninth Circuit’s materiality analysis, which addressed the strength of the prosecution’s case absent the prosecution’s false or misleading testimony, conflict with Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) by failing to assess whether the Panah’s post-conviction evidence could have impacted the verdict? ii Question 4: Did the Ninth Circuit depart from its accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it violated its own circuit rule by transferring to the merits panel—rather than a motions panel—Petitioner’s pro se motion for reconsideration of the appellate commissioner’s denial to replace counsel? iii LIST OF