Shall the District Court toll the statute of limitations under the FLSA

Questions presented. 1) Plaintiff worked as a Monitor Technician observing cardiac monitors at Alameda Health System in 2013. Plaintiff was fired from Alameda Health System in September 2013 for asking questions about unpaid overtime, unpaid shift differentials, denial of my affiliation to the : Union, not received 10 and 15 minute breaks, and for asking to transfer me to a full time job while I was actually working full time. In 2013, Plaintiff submitted a retaliation and unlawful termination claim and a wage claim to the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) of the State of California. In December 2016 (in 3 years and 4 months), DIR denied the retaliation and unlawful termination claim stating that the Plaintiff had been properly fired from AHS for committing medical negligence towards the patient. However, no one : record within both AHS and DIR confirms the allegation of the medical negligence. In December 2016, immediately after being notified by DIR that the retaliation and unlawful termination claim would be denied, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against both AHS and DIR at the District Court for Northern California, No. 3:16-cv-07414-LB. The District Court dismissed Plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act (the FLSA) claim on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired. Page 2 of 27 The question is: Shall the District Court toll the statute of limitations under the FLSA which is 2-3 years if the Plaintiff's retaliation and unlawful termination claim was investigated by a Governmental Agency (the Department of Industrial Relations of the State of California) for 3 years and 4 months instead of statutory 60 days (the former version of the California Labor Code Section 98.7)? Moreover, while Plaintiff's Appeal was pending at the 9" Circuit, the Legislature amended Labor Code Section 98.7 and explicitly ordered | to stay all statutes of limitations while a retaliation and unlawful termination claim is pending within DIR. I presented this argument to the 9™ Circuit. However, the 9" Circuit refused to accept this | argument and dismissed my Appeal No. 17-16382 on the ground that . my FLSA claim was time barred. The 9" Circuit denied my Petition for Panel Rehearing and my Petition for Rehearing En Banc. 2) In 2016, Plaintiff filed an original Complaint for Damages while residing in California. Both Defendants Alameda Health System ; (AHS) and DIR are located in California. The District Court dismissed my original Complaint with leave to amend. On April 02, 2017, I relocated to the State of New Mexico because I had gotten a Page 3 of 27 full time job at the Raymond G. Murphy VAMC in Albuquerque, NM. On April 10, 2017, I filed an Amended Complaint. I preserved Alameda Health System as one of the Defendants. I dismissed DIR from a list of the Defendants after I learned about the Eleventh . Amendment protection at the District Court. Instead of DIR itself, I listed four Officers of DIR Ms. Daly, Ms. Healy, Mr. Santos, and Mr. Rood whom I was suing in their personal capacities. 1 claimed the Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction over AHS and newly named Defendants-Officers of DIR. The District Court acknowledged the Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction over four Officers but declined the Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction over Alameda Health System. The District Court cited Groupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., . 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) that held that the Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction os determined at the time when an original Complaint was filed. The 9" Circuit agreed. In my Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, I cited a more recent case law Curry v. U.S. Bulk Transport, Inc., 462 F.3d 536, 540 (6" Circuit, 2006), “The general tule is that diversity is determined at the time of the filing of a lawsuit. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 & n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957). Notwithstanding this general rule, persuasive Page 4 of 27 authority counsels that in a situation such a