When a trial court unjustifiably orders a defendant shackled throughout trial contrary to the rule in Deck v. Missouri, is the burden on the defendant to prove the restraints were visible to the jury, or on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the shackling error did not contribute to the verdict?

Question Presented No. 1 This Court held in Deck v. Missouri that when a trial court, without adequate justification, orders a defendant “to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation.” 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005). Rather, “[t]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Jd. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Petitioner Clarence Wayne Dixon’s capital case, the lower courts all agreed that Mr. Dixon, who represented himself at trial and sentencing, had been ordered shackled with a stun belt and full-legged steel restraint without adequate legal justification in contravention of Deck. The lower courts held, however, that the trial court’s erroneous decision to shackle Mr. Dixon throughout his trial could be ignored because Mr. Dixon failed to prove that his shackles were visible to the jurors who convicted and sentenced him to death. There is wide disagreement among the federal circuit courts of appeal over whether a defendant who is unjustifiably shackled throughout trial bears the burden to prove that his shackles were visible to the jury, or whether the burden to prove otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt falls on the State. The first question presented is: 1. When a trial court unjustifiably orders a defendant shackled throughout trial contrary to the rule in Deck v. Missouri, is it the defendant who bears the burden of proving that the restraints were visible to the jury, or does the State have the burden to prove that the shackles were not visible as part of its burden under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling error did not contribute to the verdict? Question Presented No. 2 During state postconviction proceedings, Mr. Dixon raised a colorable claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyers stood silent and facilitated his request to waive counsel at his i capital trial despite evidence, known to them, which demonstrated his incompetency to make that choice—that is, they had evidence that Mr. Dixon’s desire to waive counsel resulted from his lack of a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer[s] with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). Arizona law mandates a hearing where a postconviction petitioner alleges facts, which, if proved, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Although Mr. Dixon satisfied this requirement, the postconviction court nevertheless resolved numerous disputed issues of fact against him and dismissed his Sixth Amendment claim without affording him the hearing required by law. The Arizona Supreme Court denied discretionary review. In federal habeas proceedings, despite evidence that the state court resolved disputed factual issues without a hearing, both the district court and the court of appeals determined that merits review of Mr. Dixon’s claim was precluded as a result of reasonable factual determinations made by the postconviction court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The second question presented is: 2. When a petitioner has complied with a state rule which mandates a postconviction hearing on a colorable federal constitutional claim, but the state court dismisses the claim by resolving disputed issues of material fact against the petitioner, is the state court’s denial “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” under § 2254(d)(2), thereby requiring de novo federal review of the claim? ii