Whether a defendant's waiver of counsel is not knowing, intelligent and voluntary when the defendant's only other option was to proceed to trial with counsel who insisted, over defendant's objections, on conceding guilt?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Mr. Clark represented himself at trial because his lawyer planned to concede his guilt of second-degree murder. The Louisiana Supreme Court held the Faretta waiver sufficient, finding that, under State v. McCoy, the decision whether to concede guilt belonged to counsel. This Court granted Mr. Clark’s petition, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. __ (2018). Clark v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court held: “We previously approved of this extensive Faretta colloquy in State v. Clark, 12-0508, pp. 62-63 (La. 12/19/16), 220 So.3d 583, 637-639, and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1500, — L.Ed.2d — (2018), does not render it deficient even in hindsight.” This gives rise to the following question: 1. Whether a defendant’s waiver of counsel is not knowing, intelligent and voluntary when the defendant’s only other option was to proceed to trial with counsel who insisted, over defendant’s objections, on conceding guilt? Remaining from the initial petition, is the emerging and broadening split concerning: 2. Whether, under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, the determination that death is the appropriate punishment must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt? i