Whether collateral attack on the Contract between the inventor and the United States Patent and Trademark Office in bad faith by the entire Judiciary, USPTO/PTAB, Attorneys and Corporate Infringers in violation of the Contract, Supremacy, Separation of Powers, Due Process, and Takings Clauses of the Constitution and Governing Supreme Court Precedent Law of the Case — the Supreme Law of the Land — in dishonor is a criminal trespass

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether collateral attack on the Contract between the inventor and the United States Patent and Trademark Office in bad faith by the entire Judiciary, USPTO/PTAB, Attorneys and Corporate Infringers in violation of the Contract, Supremacy, Separation of Powers, Due Process, and Takings Clauses of the Constitution and Governing Supreme Court Precedent Law of the Case — the Supreme Law of the Land — in dishonor is a criminal trespass. 2. Whether the inventor, as a woman and one of the people of the United States : of America must take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution by the entire Judiciary acting as Attorneys for Corporate Infringers, USPTO/PTAB, USDOJ, the Legislative Branch of the Government, Attorneys, and Corporate Infringers, who have overpassed the just bounds of its authority and made a tyrannical use of its powers, as the exigency suggests and prudence justifies to be the sole tribunal in the common law Court of Record, as the entire Judiciary has lost its jurisdiction by breaching its solemn oath of office. 3. Whether the Judiciary has any avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the Constitution when the Judiciary’s dereliction of duty and exertion of power have overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, and whether the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry against individuals charged with the transgression. 4, Whether the District Court depriving the inventor, a woman, of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law and denying her the equal protection of the laws and denying her ECF filing and denying her IFP status when all the other Courts had granted her IFP status after a head injury, and not enforcing the Mandated Prohibition against repudiating Government-issued Patent Contract Grants delineated in this Court’s Governing Precedent Laws of the Case — the Supreme Law of the Land — as delineated in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 US. 87 (1810), Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827); U.S. v. American Bell Telephone Company, 167 U.S. 224 (1897); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292 (1833); Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870), that a Grant is a Contract that cannot be repudiated, is subject to judicial inquiry against the District Court Judges. pty