When a juror realizes that he has been in an identical situation vis-a-vis the defendant as the victims of the defendant's crimes, is that juror unqualified to sit in judgment of the defendant?

question presented asks: When a juror realizes that he has been in an identical situation vis-a-vis the defendant as the victims of the defendant’s crimes, is that juror unqualified to sit in judgment of the defendant? 2. The state habeas court also heard from another juror on Furnish’s resentencing jury, who testified that, in contravention of the resentencing court’s order not to discuss the case with anyone, she consulted with her Roman Catholic priest to learn more about the Church’s position on the death penalty. The state habeas court found that this juror was having “reservations” about imposing the death penalty until she discussed these “reservations” with her priest. After meeting with her priest, the juror was reassured that the Catholic Church was not “against” the death penalty. The juror subsequently voted to sentence Furnish to death. Although the juror claimed that she did not discuss her conversation with her priest with the other jurors, two resentencing jurors recall things differently. The Kentucky ii Supreme Court concluded that the juror’s consultation with her priest was error, but harmless. The second question presented asks: When a defendant’s right to a neutral and impartial factfinder is violated, may a court dismiss the error by simply speculating that the error had no impact on the juror’s verdict? 3. During state habeas proceedings, it was revealed that Furnish was unable to hear all of the proceedings against him at his first trial because Furnish suffers from well-documented and uncontroverted hearing loss (he is deaf in one ear and has diminished hearing in the other ear) and because he was not afforded an accommodation such as amplifying headphones or a sign language interpreter to compensate for his hearing loss. The Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that Furnish failed to prove that such assistive technologies were available at the time of Furnish’s trial and, anyway, Furnish was able to have one of his attorneys answer his questions about what was occurring during the proceedings. The attorney, who examined numerous witnesses during Furnish’s trial, testified in the state habeas hearing that he had difficulty answering Furnish’s questions while trying to pay attention to the ongoing trial. The third question presented asks: Is requiring a hard-of-hearing criminal defendant to ask his attorney what is happening a_ accommodation? iii