Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution when the government caused the mistrial and it was entered over the defendant's objection

QUESTION PRESENTED The Court has established two standards for determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial of a defendant after a mistrial. A defendant who requests a mistrial can presumptively be retried unless there is proof that the government intentionally goaded the defendant into moving for the mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982). In contrast, a defendant who objects to the entry of a mistrial can be subjected to a second trial only where the government has made a showing of "manifest necessity" for the trial judge’s declaration of the mistrial. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). The question presented is: For purposes of determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution, does the test enunciated in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), apply when the government caused the mistrial, and the mistrial was entered over the defendant’s objection?