Does a warrantless probation search conducted outside the scope of an authorizing state regulation and not authorized by a condition of probation, and in the absence of exigent circumstances, violate the Fourth Amendment?

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has upheld probation searches pursuant to a state regulation under the “special needs doctrine.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). The Court later reaffirmed that approval, holding that a warrantless search of a probationer’s home that is supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). To determine the reasonableness of a probation search, in Knights, the Court established a balancing test weighing the intrusion upon individual privacy against the promotion of legitimate government interests. Jd. at 119-121. In 1996, Ohio enacted a statute authorizing probation searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02 (2017). It requires, however, that the trial court provide written notice to the probationer at the time of sentencing. Jd. That notice requirement was not met in this case, nor was a search otherwise authorized by a condition of probation. A subsequent probation search of Mr. Christopher Gies’s residence was conducted nonetheless. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to use the Knights balancing test for probation searches conducted without the benefit of an authorizing statute or probation condition, holding that an officer must have a warrant supported by probable cause. United States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 249-250 (4th Cir.2015). The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, applied the Knights balancing test, holding that the core reasoning of the Court in Griffin and Knights is directed at explaining why the needs of the probation system outweigh the privacy rights of the probationers generally. United States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 350 (Sth Cir.2004); United States v. Carter, 566 F.3d 970, 974-975 (11th Cir.2009). This conflict must be resolved by a holding that the warrantless search, based only upon a reasonable suspicion, is per se unreasonable under the Warrants Clause of the Fourth Amendment, which requires that “absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a ii neutral and disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978). Unless there are exigent circumstances, warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). Further, to obtain a judicial warrant, a law enforcement officer must show probable cause. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 (1987). Probable cause requires more than a finding of reasonable suspicion. Whether the probation search was constitutional was not answered by the court below, which simply found that the probation officers acted in good faith. Good faith cannot apply because the officers were aware of the facts constituting statutory noncompliance, even if they lacked knowledge of the statute itself. There is absolutely no ambiguity with respect to the notice requirement, and probation searches are an essential and often-used tool of Ohio probation officers. An officer, reasonably trained, would know of the notice requirement. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). The following questions are presented: Does a warrantless probation search conducted outside the scope of an authorizing state regulation and not authorized by a condition of probation, and in the absence of exigent circumstances, violate the Fourth Amendment? Does the good faith doctrine excuse a probation officer’s decision to conduct a probation search due to his mistaken interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02, which authorizes probation searches when notice is provided? ili